Pearl Harbor - zestrzelenia (szczegolnie przez pancerniki)

Okręty Wojenne lat 1905-1945

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dakoblue
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Pearl Harbor - zestrzelenia (szczegolnie przez pancerniki)

Post autor: dakoblue »

Przenosze to z forum IC ,tam bylo troche dyskusji na ten temat
rozmawiajac z Michalem podczas powrotu z Sympozjum uznalismy ze warto ten temat miec tez na FOW

Ciekawy jestem opinii szanownego towarzystwa
Na 29 strąconych samolotow

To co ja wyczytalem
Lotnictwo strącilo 12 samolotow
-1 Zero p.Brown na P-36
-1Zero p.Sterling
-1 Zero p.Rasmussen
-1 Zero kolizja z am.mysliwcem (p.Vogt)
-8 samolotow piloci z bazy Wheeler (Welch-4,Taylor-4)

wg.Skwiota ,co do lotnictwa to sie zgadza

-1 samolot krazownik Saint Louis
-1 samolot niszczyciel Curtiss
-1 Zero p.Brown na P-36
-1Zero p.Sterling
-1 Zero p.Rasmussen
-1 Zero kolizja z am.mysliwcem (p.Vogt)
-8 samolotow piloci z bazy Wheeler (Welch-4,Taylor-4)
-1 Kate transportowiec Avocet
Razem 15 samolotow (Lotnictwo zestrzelilo 12 )
Nie pisze w ogole ze pancerniki cos ustrzelily ,ale Skwiot o paru rzeczach w ogole nie pisze


Idac dalej z radosnej tworczosci raportow :

Niszczyciel Allen – 2 zestrzelenia (1 z Browningow)
transportowiec Avocet – jak pisalem wyzej 1 stracenie (76 mm)-potwierdzone
Niszczyciel Bagley – 7 samolotow (!) z tego 5 przez Browningi
Niszczyciel Blue –5 samolotow z czego 1 przez Browningi
USS Breeze – 1 zestrzelenie z 76 mm
Niszczyciel Chaw – 1 zestrzelenie z 76 mm
Niszczyciel Cummings –2 zestrzelenia (1 przez Browningi )
Niszczyciel Curtiss – 3 zestrzelenia ,- 1 można mu przyznac bo samolot się rozbil na jego pokladzie
Niszczyciel Dale –3 zestrzelenia ,wszystkie przez Browningi – 1 potwierdzone
Krazownik Detroit – 2 zestrzelenia (lacznie z niszczycielem Curtiss) –1 potwierdzone
Niszczyciel Farragut – 1 zestrzelenie przez Browningi
Niszczyciel Gamble –1 zestrzelenie z Browningow
Niszczyciel Helm –1 zestrzelenie przez Browningi
Krazownik Helena ma jeszcze wieksza fantazje –podaje zestrzelenie 7 maszyn 
USS Hulbert – 1 zestrzelenie
Niszczyciel Hull – 3 zestrzelenia ,wszystkie przez Browningi
USS Medusa – 2 zestrzelenia (76 mm i Browningi)
Niszczyciel Mugford – 3 zestrzelenia wszystkie z Browningow
Niszczyciel Patterson –1 zestrzelenie ze 127 mm
USS Perry –co najmniej 1 z Browningow
USS Phelps –1 zestrzelenie z 1’1 cala
Krazownik Raleigh – 5 zestrzelen (76mm,1’1 cala i Browningi)
USS Selfridge – 2-3 zestrzelenia (1’1 cala i Browningi)
Krazownik St Louis – 3 zestrzelenia ,1 pewne
USS Sumner –1 zestrzelenie z 76 mm
USS Swan –1 zestrzelenie 76 mm
USS Tangier –1 zestrzelenie 76 mm i Browningi
USS Thornton –1 zestrzelenie –Browningi
Niszczyciel Tucker –2-3 zestrzelenia (Browningi)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Razem : 65-67 zestrzelen ,potwierdzonych 5

A jak się spisaly pancerniki ? Proszę bardzo

Arizona
Arizona przyznaje się do zestrzelenia 2 samolotow przez... Browningi
ale to co najmniej watpliwe

California
- raport z Californii podaje zestrzelenie jednego samolotu przez Browningi
i jednego wspolnie z innymi okretami

Maryland – 7 z tego cztery na pewno ,hehehe (w tym dwa z Browningow)

Nevada w odwaznych fantazjach – 5 zestrzelen pewnych(1) z tego uwaga :
-1 samolot przez Browningi
-3 samoloty przez inna baterie Browningow
-1 samolot przez 5 calowke (brawo!)
nastepne 3 nierozpoznane samoloty w bardzo bliskim zasiegu do 200 jardow czyli prawdopodobnie przez Browningi

Pensylvania
Wystrzelila mase amunicji niestety nieskutecznie ,zadnego potwierdzonego stracenia

Tennessee – nie przyznaje się do zadnych trafien samolotow

West Virginia – nie przyznaje się do trafien

Razem 16 samolotow

Podsumowanie :
Piloci 12,inne okrety 5 na pewno (ponad 65 prawdopodobnych) =17

Pytanie ile mozna zaliczyc z tych prawdopodobnych
i ktory pancernik cokolwiek zestrzelil :D
Absolut
KO-wiec
Posty: 396
Rejestracja: 2004-03-07, 22:20

Post autor: Absolut »

Oklahoma - 0 samolotów...
"I've nothing much to offer
There's nothing much to take
I'm an absolute beginner
But I'm absolutely sane..."
:D
Awatar użytkownika
fdt
Posty: 1644
Rejestracja: 2004-01-04, 15:49
Lokalizacja: Elbląg

Post autor: fdt »

1 samolot przez 5 calowke (brawo!)
Wykonalne, ale raczej na zasadzie "uderzyłeś mnie waść szczęką w pięść"
radar1

Re: Pearl Harbor - zestrzelenia (szczegolnie przez pancernik

Post autor: radar1 »

To co ja wyczytalem
Lotnictwo strącilo 12 samolotow
-1 Zero p.Brown na P-36
-1Zero p.Sterling
-1 Zero p.Rasmussen
-1 Zero kolizja z am.mysliwcem (p.Vogt)
-8 samolotow piloci z bazy Wheeler (Welch-4,Taylor-4)

wg.Skwiota ,co do lotnictwa to sie zgadza

-1 samolot krazownik Saint Louis
-1 samolot niszczyciel Curtiss
-1 Zero p.Brown na P-36
-1Zero p.Sterling
-1 Zero p.Rasmussen
-1 Zero kolizja z am.mysliwcem (p.Vogt)
-8 samolotow piloci z bazy Wheeler (Welch-4,Taylor-4)
-1 Kate transportowiec Avocet
Razem 15 samolotow (Lotnictwo zestrzelilo 12 )
Nie pisze w ogole ze pancerniki cos ustrzelily ,ale Skwiot o paru rzeczach w ogole nie pisze


Czy macie jakieś raporty ile samolotów zostało uszkodzonych z konkretnych lotn.
Wiem że np. Kaga miał zaledwie 39 sprawnych maszyn (z 72+9 przed uderzeniem)
karolk

Post autor: karolk »

mnie Browningi nieodparcie kojarzą się z karabinami maszynowymi, a takim czymś strzelanie do opancerzonych celów jest marnowaniem amunicji, ale tu pewnie chodzi o jakieś działka... 8)
dakoblue
Posty: 1608
Rejestracja: 2004-01-05, 08:42
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Post autor: dakoblue »

karolk pisze:mnie Browningi nieodparcie kojarzą się z karabinami maszynowymi, a takim czymś strzelanie do opancerzonych celów jest marnowaniem amunicji, ale tu pewnie chodzi o jakieś działka... 8)
12,7 mm karabiny maszynowe .Najskuteczniejsza bron przeciwko samolotom w PH :D
karolk

Post autor: karolk »

ach so, jejku gołymi rękoma strącili takie ilości samolotów? Woooow, to tylko w Hameryce możliwe... :lol: wiesz dako, Doamld Macintyre w swojej wspaniałe książce Pogromca u-bootów określił tego typu "broń" opelot jako dobrą na... kaczki, a właśnie to miał na swoim niszczycielu
karolk

Post autor: karolk »

Donald oczywiście, stale mi się tu kręcą i przeszkadzają... :?
dakoblue
Posty: 1608
Rejestracja: 2004-01-05, 08:42
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Post autor: dakoblue »

nie wiem czy na kaczki ,ale takie sa fakty
specyfika polozenia okretow ,umiarkowana widocznosc,ataki z niskiego pulapu i owczesne mozliwosci broni opl spowodowaly takie a nie inne wyniki
Obrazek
Ostatnio zmieniony 2004-09-27, 12:56 przez dakoblue, łącznie zmieniany 1 raz.
Gość

Post autor: Gość »

dakoblue pisze:
karolk pisze:mnie Browningi nieodparcie kojarzą się z karabinami maszynowymi, a takim czymś strzelanie do opancerzonych celów jest marnowaniem amunicji, ale tu pewnie chodzi o jakieś działka... 8)
12,7 mm karabiny maszynowe .Najskuteczniejsza bron przeciwko samolotom w PH :D
Czy istnieje opis, zestawienie baterii PLOT bazy PH
dakoblue
Posty: 1608
Rejestracja: 2004-01-05, 08:42
Lokalizacja: Elblag

Post autor: dakoblue »

Anonymous pisze:
dakoblue pisze:
karolk pisze:mnie Browningi nieodparcie kojarzą się z karabinami maszynowymi, a takim czymś strzelanie do opancerzonych celów jest marnowaniem amunicji, ale tu pewnie chodzi o jakieś działka... 8)
12,7 mm karabiny maszynowe .Najskuteczniejsza bron przeciwko samolotom w PH :D
Czy istnieje opis, zestawienie baterii PLOT bazy PH
pewno jest ,ja nie mam pod reka troche opisu tutaj
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/I/USMC-I-II-1.html
dakoblue
Posty: 1608
Rejestracja: 2004-01-05, 08:42
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Post autor: dakoblue »

dakoblue
Posty: 1608
Rejestracja: 2004-01-05, 08:42
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Post autor: dakoblue »

to ciekawe

OFFICE OF THE
COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND NAVY YARD,
PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII, U. S. A.
C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14
(629)

Confidential 30 DEC. 1940.

From: Commandant,
Fourteenth Naval District.
To:
The Chief of Naval Operations
Via:
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject:
Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present
Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.
References:
(a) Opnav dispatch 092135 of October 1940.
(b) Opnav dispatch 182128 of October 1940.
(c) Chief of Naval Operations' personal letter addressed to CINCUS
dated 22 November 1940 (copy sent to Com 14).
(d) Com 14 dispatch 150055 of October 1940.
(e) Com 14 dispatch 220230 of October 1940.
1. In view of the inquiries contained in references (a), (b) and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.
2. AIRCRAFT RAIDS.
Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling attack. First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second, by driving off attacking bombers with antiaircraft guns and fighters. The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area fifty-nine B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as being obsolete. The model is six years old and the planes themselves are five years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory for the purposes intended. New bombing planes are expected sometime in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet.
To drive off bombing planes after they have been launched will require both fighting planes and anti-aircraft guns. The Army has in the Hawaiian area thirty-six pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are six years old and some of them are four years old. In numbers and models there is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is in production to the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. This does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not appear adequate.
The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor base by antiaircraft guns. There are in Hawaii twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty-four mobile 3-inch guns. There are projected twenty-four more, to be delivered in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 109 .50 caliber out of the projected 120 37-millimeter and 308 .50 caliber machine guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to increase the numbers of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblance of antiaircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the efficacy of a 3-inch gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The Army has made no plans for the anti-aircraft defense of Lualualei or Kaneohe, furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of anti-aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu in order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited knowledge of the density of anti-aircraft barrages abroad, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area. This number is in addition to 37-millimeter and .50 caliber machine guns.
In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning service which will consist of eight Radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed and five are mobile. When completed at an indefinite time in the future, this warning net should be adequate.
Page 540
3. DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES.
The ideal defense against submarines would be conducted by patrol vessels and aircraft working in conjunction. The district has no aircraft for this purpose. Recently, there have arrived here three vessels of Destroyer Division EIGHTY which is assigned to the local defense forces. These vessels have listening gear and, when repaired and ready for service, will be a valuable contribution for antisubmarine and escort work. A large number of patrol vessels will be required for anti-submarine work in the vicinity of Oahu and the other islands. At present, the district has none and request would have to be made on the Fleet for such vessels and planes as could be spared for this most important work. No anti-submarine nets are planned, nor are any considered desirable. Anti-torpedo nets are projected for the entrances of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. They will probably be delivered about 1 March 1941. The net depot will be completed somewhat later.
4. DEFENSE AGAINST MINES.
The district has recently built and equipped one sweep barge and three tugs are being equipped for towing and energizing the coil. This barge can probably look out for Honolulu and Pearl Harbor until such time as it is seriously injured. The district has no vessels available for use as sweeps for anchored mines. A number of mine sweepers are being built or purchased, but their delivery dates here are uncertain. A large number of sweepers will be required in order to keep the harbors of Pearl Harbor, Honolulu and Kaneohe clear and, in addition, Hilo on Hawaii, Kahului and Lahaina on Maui, and Port Allen and Nawiliwili on Kauai. With the delivery of sweepers now being built or purchased, the general situation will be improved immeasurably.
5. DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBARDMENT.
The coast defenses of the Army are considered adequate except that Kaneohe receives very little protection from the batteries.
6. SABOTAGE.
There are two tank farms, the upper and the lower. The lower is entirely contained in the government reservation and, by the use of roving patrols, is considered reasonably secure. The upper farm is adjacent to a public highway. The farm is surrounded by an unclimbable fence and each tank with an earth berm. Its chief exposure is along the highway. To counteract this, three elevated sentry stations have been erected, each equipped with searchlights. This enables sentries to keep a continuous lookout over the entire fence line day and night, the upper farm is considered fairly secure.
7. WATER AND ELECTRIC SUPPLY.
Recently, a guard house has been erected and an arrangement has been made, the Marines alternating with the Army, for constant guard on the water supply.
A constant guard is kept on the electric supply lines through which outside power is received.
8. An elaborate system of photographic passes, search and examination is in effect. There are over 5,000 Civil Service employees who come into the yard each day. In addition, there are about 5,000 employees of civilian contractors and several thousand enlisted men. In addition to the above, there is a constant stream of trucks and vehicles of all descriptions carrying supplies, stores, et cetera. It is impossible to maintain absolute security without disruption of the work of the yard. However, surprise searches and periodic stops, et cetera, are in effect in order that the alert may be emphasized. The main gate has been strengthened to prevent rushing; there have been two drills for the purpose of giving surprise training to the yard garrison in the event of a surprise riot in the yard. In addition to the above, a survey has been made not only of the yard but of all of the outlying stations, and every effort is being made to close holes and stop gaps. While the Commandant is not satiated, he feels that the precautions taken are reasonably effective but that they are susceptible to improvement, which will be made as occasion warrants.
9. It should be borne in mind that until comparatively recently none of us in this country had very much conception of what measures were necessary and what provisions were desirable in order to effect any measure of protection against aircraft, against submarines, against mines and against subversive elements. The officers and men of this command have been alert, zealous and vigilant in executing all measures under their control in order to properly prepare the district for any exigencies.
10. It should be assumed that the War Department is fully aware of the situation here and that they are proceeding vigorously with a view to overcoming deficiencies. It may be that they have failed to recognize the necessity for large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. I suggest that the Chief of Naval Operations make inquiry from the War Department as to what their plans are and on what dates they predict that they will be accomplished and then, if the numbers and dates are not satisfactory, these features may be discussed at length.
11. It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the officials of the Fourteenth Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters.
C. C. Bloch.
Absolut
KO-wiec
Posty: 396
Rejestracja: 2004-03-07, 22:20

Post autor: Absolut »

karolk pisze:mnie Browningi nieodparcie kojarzą się z karabinami maszynowymi, a takim czymś strzelanie do opancerzonych celów jest marnowaniem amunicji, ale tu pewnie chodzi o jakieś działka... 8)
Gdybyś był na Sympozjum - to zobaczyłbyś na żywo te jak je nazwałeś "karabiny maszynowe"... :-D
"I've nothing much to offer
There's nothing much to take
I'm an absolute beginner
But I'm absolutely sane..."
:D
dakoblue
Posty: 1608
Rejestracja: 2004-01-05, 08:42
Lokalizacja: Elblag

Post autor: dakoblue »

w raportach jest masa ciekawych rzeczy :D

ANTIAIRCRAFT

All naval antiaircraft batteries, consisting of 780 guns, were ship-
based; that is, located on the ships in Pearl Harbor. At the time of the
attack, roughly one-fourth of all antiaircraft guns were manned, and
within 7 to 10 minutes, all antiaircraft batteries were manned and
firing. It appears that all naval batteries were in operating condition;
the number of temporary gun stoppages during action was so low as to be
negligible. All ships had the full service allowance of ammunition on
board, except in a few instances where removal was necessary because of
repairs in progress, and ammunition was ready at the guns in accordance
with existing directives. Ready antiaircraft machine guns opened fire
immediately and within an average estimated time of under 5 minutes
practically all battleship antiaircraft batteries were firing; cruisers
were firing all antiaircraft batteries within an average time of 4
minutes; and destroyers, though opening up with machine guns almost
immediately, averaged 7 minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into
action. Minor combatant types had all joined in the fire within 10
minutes after the beginning of the attack. [42]

In the case of the Army, the following table reflects the places and
times at which antiaircraft units were in position: [43]

In position and ready
Regiment Battery to fire

Sixty-fourth A (searchlight) at Honolulu 10:00 a.m.
(alerted at 8:15 a.m.) B (3-inch) at Aiea 10:00 a.m.
C (3-inch) at Aliamanu 10:30 a.m.
D (3-inch) south of Aliamanu 11:00 a.m.
E (searchlight) at Ewa- (Time not
Pearl Harbor known)
F (3-inch) at Pearl City 11:05 a.m.
G (3-inch) at Ahua Point 10:30 a.m.
H (3-inch) at Fort Weaver 10:00 a.m.
I (37-mm) at Aliamanu (Known only
K (37-mm) at Hickam Field that batteries
L (37-mm) at Hickam Field were in posi-
tion before
11:45 a.m.)
M (37-mm) at Wheeler Field 11:55 a.m.
Ninety-seventh A (searchlight) at Fort
Kamehameha 8:34 a.m.
(alerted between 7:55 F (3-inch) at Fort Kamehameha 8:55 a.m.
and 8:10 a.m.). G (3-inch) at Fort Weaver 8:30 a.m.
H (3-inch) at Fort Barrett 10:20 a.m.
Ninety-eighth. A (searchlight) at Schofield (Time not
Barracks known.)
B (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 9:55 a.m.
C (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 10:30 a.m.
D (3-inch) at Puuloa Dump,
south of Ewa 11:45 a.m.
F (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air
Station 1:15 p.m.
G (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air
Station 1:15 p.m.
H (3-inch) at Waipahu High
School 1:30 p.m.

[41] See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 114.
[42] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 123, 124.
[43] See committee exhibit No. 5.



In position and ready
Regiment Battery to fire

Two Hundred and A (searchlight) at Ewa (Time not
Fifty-first known)
B (3-inch) at West Loch 11:45 a.m.
C (3-inch) at Ewa Beach 11:45 a.m.
D (3-inch) at South of Ewa 11:45 a.m.
E (50-caliber) at Navy Yard
Pearl Harbor 12:41 p.m.
F (37-mm) at Navy Recreation
area 12:30 p.m.
G (37-mm) at tank farm,
Schofield Barracks 11:00 a.m.
H (37-mm) at Navy Yard 12:05 p.m.

One antiaircraft detachment was located at Sand Island when the attack
started and engaged the enemy with 3-inch guns at 8:15 a. m., shooting
down two enemy planes at that time.

The foregoing table reflects that of 31 army antiaircraft batteries,
27 were not in position and ready to fire until after the attack and in
several instances not for a considerable period of time after the
attack.

The extraordinary lack of readiness of Army antiaircraft units appears
to have been occasioned largely by the time required for moving into
position and the fact that ammunition was not readily accessible to the
mobile batteries. [44]
Ostatnio zmieniony 2004-09-27, 13:22 przez dakoblue, łącznie zmieniany 1 raz.
dakoblue
Posty: 1608
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Post autor: dakoblue »

DEFENSIVE FORCES AND FACILITIES OF THE ARMY IN HAWAII


As of December 6, 1941, General Short had a total of 42,959 officers and
men under his command. The principal elements of the Hawaiian Department
were 2 infantry divisions and supporting ground troops composing the
beach and land defense forces; the Coast Artillery Command, consisting
of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense forces; and the Hawaiian Air
Force. [66]

The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command had a total of 213 antiaircraft
guns. [57] Eighty-six were 3-inch antiaircraft guns (70 percent mobile);
20, 37-millimeter; and 107 caliber .50.

The Army on December 7, prior to the attack, had a total of 227 planes
[58] located principally at Hickam, Wheeler, and Bellows Fields. They
consisted of 12 heavy bombers; 36 medium bombers (obsolescent); 14 light
bombers (2 obsolescent); 152 pursuit planes (53 obsolescent); and 13
observation planes. [59] Eighty-seven of these planes for one reason or
another were not available for flight, including 6 of the heavy bombers
and 58 of the pursuit planes. Ninety-four pursuit planes (including 30
of the obsolescent craft) were available for flight.

In addition, the Army had six mobile radar units which were available
and in operating condition. [60]
ODPOWIEDZ