http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/147/14 ... 0of%201941
W 1940 roku, priorytetem dla Japonii były Chiny i w tym kierunku szły wszystkie wysiłki dyplomatyczne i wojskowe. W tym czasie japsy dogadali sie z UK i angole zamknęli drogę birmańską. Dogadali się z Francuzami, którym pomogli w bójce z Syjamem. Dogadywali sie z Holendrami w kwestii dostaw surowców, składali pojednawcze propozycje USA ... np w kwestii wycofania sie z Indochin Francuskich... itd... itp... O wojnie z Jankami nikt nie myślał bo od czerwca 1940 roku wiadomo było że ci właśnie zaczęli budowę takiej floty o jakiej Mikado mógl tylko pomarzyć... Nie myslano o wojnie z USA bo o wojnie mysli sie wtedy kiedy jest szansa na jej wygranie... a przwdopodobieństwo, że Nagato wplynie na Potomac (czy gdzies w pobliżu) bylo równe zeru...
Rozmowy trwały i trwały... od 1940 roku co najmniej... a Janki były twarde i nie chciały odpuscic nawet guzika.
On 5 August 1941, the Japanese Government instructed their Ambassador to the United States to submit a plan for local settlement of the French Indo-China question, and, on 8 August, to sound out the possibility of holding a direct top-level meeting of President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye. However, the United States flatly rejected both these offers.
The substance of the Japanese plan regarding the settlement on a local basis was:
1. Japan would not occupy any land other than French Indo-China and would withdraw troops from French Indo-China after the China Incident was settled.
2. The Japanese Government would respect the neutrality of the Philippines.
3. The United States would withdraw their recent reinforcements from various bases in the Southwest Pacific as these were believed to constitute a threat to Japan and the governments of both Great Britain and the Netherlands would be advised to take similar action.
4. The United States would cooperate with Japan in the latter's acquisition of materials from the Southwest Pacific, particularly from the Netherlands East Indies and would take the measures necessary to restore normal relations with Japan.
Spurred on by Japan's occupation of southern French Indo-China, the United States enacted an over-all embargo against Japan on 17 August and, at the same time, President Roosevelt declared that he "could not tolerate Japan's advance by armed force and would not continue meetings unless Japan's expansionist activities were stopped." On 27 August, Premier Konoye addressed a message to President Roosevelt stating the Japanese Government's peaceful intentions and proposed "a general consultation by the top leaders of the two countries to break the deadlock and accelerate negotiations." The United States, however, stated that they were not prepared to accept the offer unless there were first preliminary discussions on the main items as the United States recognized that there was a certain element in Japan which would attempt to obstruct the successful conclusion of negotiations.
The Japanese-Netherlands East Indies negotiations, which were begun in September 1940 by Special Envoy Kobayashi were the outcome of Japan's urgent demands for the procurement or the assurance of procurement of fuel oil (a basic necessity for the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia). No actual progress was made, however, as the Dutch Government, being located in London, was wholly dependent on Britain and was not prepared to make concessions to Japan, who had signed the Tripartite Alliance with Germany and had advocated a new order in East Asia. On 2 January 1941, the talks were resumed at Batavia with Envoy Yoshizawa replacing Kobayashi. On 18 June, negotiations ended in complete failure. Thereupon, Japan took the second step in her southward advance - the occupation of southern French Indo-China - which suggested the use of force against the Netherlands East Indies. This led to a general United States embargo against Japan and became one of the causes that ultimately forced oil-hungry Japan to go to war.
Japan's demands during the negotiations were: Participation in the development of the abundant Netherlands East Indies resources and further economic cooperation to include freedom of access by the Japanese to the Netherlands East Indies; permission to engage in enterprises; freedom of access of Japanese ships to unopened ports of the Netherlands East Indies for the purpose of transporting resources; opening of part of the coastal services and the development of the fishing industry by resident Japanese, as well as the assurance of an adequate supply of oil to Japan.
The Netherlands East Indies refused these demands for the following reasons: First of all, they felt unrest and doubt over the expansionist policy of Japan since the Manchurian Incident. Secondly, Japan's tendency to advance southward by force and the fact that Japan had sided with Germany caused anxiety. Thirdly, Holland felt that her only hope of survival lay in a British victory. The Netherlands East Indies as a colony of Holland, had no choice but to support Great Britain and to prevent the flow of commodities to Germany. In addition, as the Anglo-United States bloc, which had vested interests in the East Indies, intensified their blockade, the attitude of the Netherlands East Indies toward Japan also stiffened.
Consequently, at an Imperial Conference on 2 July, Japan decided to adopt the "Outline of the Empire's National Policy to Cope with the Changing Situation." By executing a daring plan calling for the occupation of southern French Indo-China, Japan hoped to gain dominance over the military situation in the southern areas and to force the Netherlands East Indies to accede to her demands. This led to the Netherlands East Indies embargo of oil shipments to Japan and constituted a definite cause for the commencement of the Pacific War.
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